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Applications of the Public Trust Doctrine to the 
Protection and Preservation of Wetlands: Can It 
Fill the Statutory Gaps? 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A. Background 
It has only been. in relatively recent times that western 
society has deemed it necessary to protect the environment 
from development and abuse. 1 But even so, our nation has 
been ambivalent toward environmental protection, wavering 
between calls for development, justified by economic need, and 
concern for what appears to be an environmental catastrophe 
in the making. 2 Wetlands3 have not avoided this dilema. By 
1976, perhaps as much as forty percent of the wetlands in the 
United States had been destroyed. 4 
In 1954, the first effort to inventory the nation's wetlands 
began.5 The next such effort, the National Wetlands Inventory 
Project, commenced in 1974 and was much broader in purpose, 
1. According to Roderick Nash, development of the wilderness, especially in 
the United States, was largely considered a necessary step to physical and econom-
ic security. A change in attitude toward nature and wilderness began to appear, 
beginning with the writings of Henry David Thoreau, in the latter part of the 
nineteenth century. It was not until the 1960s, however, that large scale public 
support began to appear for preservation of the environment. RODERICK NASH, 
WILDERNESS AND THE AMERICAN MIND (3rd ed. 1982). 
2. ld. 
3. The Army Corps of Engineers, The EPA, The Fish and Wildlife Service, the 
U.S. Department of Agriculture Soil Conservation Service and other interested 
federal agencies have long been operating under different definitions of wetlands. 
In 1989, the FEDERAL MANUAL FOR IDENTIFYING AND DELINEATING JURISDICTIONAL 
WETLANDS (Delineation Manual) was published. This standardized the definition of 
wetlands among the various federal agencies involved. According to the Delineation 
Manual, wetlands have three basic characteristics: "hydrophobic vegetation, hydric 
soils, and wetland hydrology." ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, E.P.A., F.W.S. AND 
U.S.D.A. SOIL CONSERVATION SERVICE, THE FEDERAL ANNUAL FOR IDENTIFYING AND 
DELINEATING JURISDICTIONAL WETLANDS, Part II 2.0 (1989). 
4. Joan M. Ferretti, Restoring the Nations Wetlands: Can the Clean Water 
Act's Dredge and Fill Guidelines Do the Job?, 1 PACE ENV. 1. REV. 105, 106 
(1983). 
5. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, CLASSIFICATION OF 
WETLANDS AND DEEPWATER HABITAT OF THE UNITED STATES, 2 (1979). 
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providing comprehensive data on the characteristics and extent 
of the nation's wetlands for the first time.6 Since completion of 
the inventory project in 1979, no major studies have compre-
hensively reconsidered the inventory.7 It was not until the 
passage of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act 
Amendments of 19728 that the federal government took affir-
mative steps to actually protect the ecological integrity of 
wetlands for wetlands' sake. 9 
Wetlands protection came to the forefront of public atten-
tion as the scientific community gathered more information 
about the importance of wetlands. Wetlands serve a variety of 
ecological functions, among them: "[W]etlands regulate water 
flows, storing water and buffering the effects of storms. They 
filter and help to purify water, and they provide essential habi-
tat for flora and fauna."10 Wetlands also act as a nursery for a 
great deal of wildlife.U Between sixty and ninety percent of 
the coastal fisheries depend on wetlands as spawning grounds; 
the fur and hide industries also depend on wetlands for their 
vitality, as do sport fishermen and birdwatchers. 12 Further, 
over thirty percent of the Nation's endangered species depend 
on wetlands for their survival. 13 It also appears that wetlands 
help to stabilize local weather by moderating local temperature 
and precipitation. 14 
6. Id. 
7. Bill 0. Wilen & Warren E. Frayer, Status and Trends of U.S. Wetlands and 
Deepwater Habitats, 33/34 FOREST ECOLOGY AND MGMT., 181, 182 (1990). 
8. 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1989). 
9. The Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899 granted regulatory jurisdiction over 
"Navigable waters of the United States" to the Army Corps of Engineers. 33 U.S.C. 
§ 403. If a wetland fulfills the statutes definition of navigable, it is deemed to fall 
under the jurisdiction of the Army Corps of Engineers. Navigability under this 
statute has been defined as, 1) navigability in fact, 2) connection with other water-
ways making such waters usable as highways of interstate commerce. Minnehaha 
Creek Watershed Dist. v. Hoffman, 597 F.2d 617, 622-623 (8th Cir. 1979); see also 
The Daniel Ball v. United States, 77 U.S. (10 Wall) 557, 563 (1871). 
Thus, the Army Corps of Engineers has had jurisdiction over wetlands for some 
time, but § 404 of the Clean Water Act is the first statute which has protected 
wetlands for their own sake rather than for purposes of navigation or waterfowl 
preservation. 
10. Wilen, supra note 7, at 182. 
11. Id. 
12. Id. at 183. 
13. Id. 
14. ld.; see also FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE, supra note 5, at 39. This report 
also makes special note of the intrinsic values of wetlands. 
For many personal reasons, whether ethical, religious, aesthetic or recre-
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B. Inadequacies of Section 404 
The fill and dredge permit system of section 40415 of the 
Federal Water Pollution Control Aces has slowed but not 
stopped the loss of wetlands. In 1981 the conversion of coastal 
wetlands was reduced by only seventy to eighty-five percentY 
Even greater losses continue for inland wetlands. 18 In part, 
these continued losses result from enforcement problems under 
the present protection scheme, but most losses result from ac-
tivities that do not fall under the jurisdiction of section 404 or 
most state statutes. "Agricultural conversions involving drain-
age, clearing, land leveling, ground water pumping, and surface 
water diversion were responsible for eighty percent [of 
wetlands] conversions."19 In the twenty year period from the 
mid-1950's to the mid-1970's, 11,000,000 acres of wetlands 
were so converted,20 and the present system established by 
section 404 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act does not 
provide a means to stop it. 
The present administration has declared a policy of "no net 
loss" of America's wetlands.21 Unless they make considerable 
changes in the means by which we protect wetlands, the pres-
ent system will allow for their continued conversion. 
[d. 
ational in nature, people value wetlands for their intrinsic qualities. Be-
cause these intrinsic values are intangible and thus difficult to express in 
quantitative and economic terms, they are often overlooked in a society 
where decisions are based on numerical cost-benefit analyses. 
15. See infra text accompanying note 28. 
16. 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1989). 
17. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, WETLANDS: THEIR 
USE AND REGULATION, 141 (1984). 
18. ld. at 7. 
19. ld. 
20. ld. at 87. 
21. OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL REGISTER, NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS AD-
MINISTRATION, PuBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES, GEORGE 
BUSH, 1989, BooK II (1990). The official press release read: 
The President has called for a national goal of "no net loss" of wetlands. 
Consistent with that pledge, an interagency task force has been convened 
and is meeting to develop recommendations to meet that goal. The presi-
dent has proposed special legislative authority to allow interest from mon-
ies collected under the Pullman-Robinson Act to be used for wetland pur-
chase under the North American Waterfowl Management Act. 
ld. It is still unclear what the Bush administration meant by "no net loss", and 
aside from the purchase proposal, it is still unclear what other steps the adminis-
tration had in mind to initiate the policy. 
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C. The Public Trust Doctrine Can Fill the Gap. 
The public trust doctrine traditionally protected the states' 
interest in keeping large public waterways free for navigation 
and public use. 22 Since then, the doctrine has been greatly 
expanded to allow for the protection of a variety of different 
interests in waters that would otherwise not be considered 
navigable in the formal sense. 23 
The public trust doctrine can be applied to protect 
wetlands from the removal of their vital water, a major means 
of their destruction, regardless of their navigability. It may 
also place a responsibility on the states to take other affirma-
tive actions to protect wetlands. Thus the public trust doctrine 
fills a vital gap in the protection of wetlands which the present 
federal and state protection schemes have left unprotected. 
II. PROTECTION OF WETLANDS UNDER SECTION 404 OF THE 
FEDERAL WATER POLLUTION CONTROL AcT 
In 1972, Congress passed the Federal Water Pollution Con-
trol Act Amendments expressly intending, "to restore and 
maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the 
Nation's waters."24 The Federal Water Pollution Control 
Ace5 makes it unlawful to "discharge . . . any pollutant" in-
to the navigable waters of the United States.26 For the pur-
poses of this Act, the definition of navigable waters is broad, 
and has been interpreted by the EPA to include a variety of 
bodies of wate~7 that would not be considered navigable un-
22. Harrison C. Dunning, The Public Trust Doctrine and Western Water Law: 
Discord or Harmony, 30 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. !NST., 17-1, 17-24 (1984). 
23. Charles F. Wilkinson, The Headwaters of the Public Trust: Some Thoughts 
on the Source and Scope of the Traditional Doctrine, 19 ENVTL. L., 425, 465 (1989). 
24. 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1989). 
25. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1386 (1989). 
26. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (1989). 
27. "Waters of the United States" are defined by the EPA as, 
(a) All waters which are currently used, were used in the past, or may be suscep-
tible to use in interstate or foreign commerce, including all waters which are sub-
ject to the ebb and flow of the tide; 
(b) All interstate waters, including interstate "wetlands;" 
(c) All other waters such as intrastate lakes, rivers, streams (including intermittent 
streams), mudflats, sandflats, "wetlands," sloughs, prairie potholes, wet meadows, 
playa lakes, or natural ponds the use, degradation, or destruction of which would 
affect or could affect interstate or foreign commerce .... 
40 C.F.R. § 122.2 (1991). Thus, if a given body of water fits the definition of a 
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der the traditional definition.28 Pollutants are defined by the 
Act to include: "[D]redged spoil, solid waste, incinerator resi-
due, sewage, garbage, . . . rock, sand, [and] cellar dirt . . . . 
"
29 This definition is sufficiently broad to make it illegal to 
discharge almost anything into a wetland. 
Section 404 of the Act establishes a permitting system for 
the legal discharge of dredge or fill material into navigable wa-
ters. However, it was specifically intended to prevent the 
dumping of fill into the Nation's wetlands.30 Section 404 dele-
gates power to issue such permits to the Army Corps of Engi-
neers.31 The EPA also has veto power over dredge and fill 
permits under certain circumstances. 32 
Before a permit can be issued under section 404, the Army 
Corps of Engineers, or a designated state permitting authori-
ty,33 must conclude that the permittee will comply with four 
limiting guidelines. First, there must be no practicable alter-
native; second, there must be no significant adverse impacts; 
third, all reasonable mitigation must be employed; and fourth, 
no other statutory violations may occur.34 
As this very abbreviated overview of section 404 shows, the 
federal scheme for protecting wetlands concerns itself primarily 
with what goes into wetlands, not with what is taken out.35 
Section 404 excludes application of the permitting requirement 
for "normal farming operations, silviculture and ranching activ-
ities such as plowing, seeding, cultivating, [and] minor 
drainage . . . ."36 Thus, the major source of wetlands conver-
wetland, it will be subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Water Pollution Con-
trol Act. 
28. The Daniel Ball v. United States, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563 (1870). Here, 
the Court defined navigable waters as "navigable in fact. And they are navigable 
in fact when they are used, or are susceptible of being used, in their ordinary 
condition, as highways for commerce, over which trade and travel are or may be 
conducted in the customary modes of trade." 
29. 33 u.s.c. § 1362(6) (1989). 
30. 33 u.s.c. § 1344 (1989). 
31. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(d) (1989). 
32. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(c) (1989). The Administrator may "prohibit the specifica-
tion (including the withdrawal of specification) of any ... disposal site," and may 
do so "whenever he determines ... that the discharge of such materials into such 
area will have an unacceptable adverse effect on municipal water supplies, shellfish 
beds and fishery areas ... wildlife, or recreational areas." 
33. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(h) (1989). 
34. Ferretti, supra note 4, at 109 (citing 40 C.F.R. § 230.10 (a)-(d) (1990)). 
35. ld. at 108. 
36. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(0(1)(A) (1989). 
480 B.Y. U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 6 
sion, agriculture,37 is largely exempt from the limitations of 
the Act. 
As mentioned above, a variety of other activities which 
may destroy or adversely affect wetlands do not fall under the 
Act's jurisdiction.38 Among these are excavation, clearing, 
drainage and water allocation, either upstream or ground wa-
ter, none of which constitute fills for the purpose of section 
404.39 "These activities were responsible for the vast majority 
of past conversions, especially in inland areas, where 95% of 
the Nation's wetlands are located. Inland freshwater wetlands 
are generally poorly protected.'>4° 
Of particular concern is the impact of water allocation on 
wetlands. Water is of course the key element of any wetland 
area: 
The effects of [water] withdrawals and diversions on down-
stream wetlands are twofold. First, upstream depletions may 
lower the water table in downstream freshwater wetlands, 
causing a temporary or permanent loss of vegetation and a 
decrease in habitat values. Second, decreasing freshwater 
inflow in coastal areas will allow tidal incursion of saltwater 
into the brackish and freshwater marshes. The increase in 
salinity to these marshes will reduce species diversity and 
abundance as well as overall ecosystem productivity.41 
The effectiveness of federal efforts to protect the water 
resources necessary for wetlands preservation is inhibited by 
the nature of water law. The power to allocate water has been 
left primarily to the respective states.42 Although it is clear 
from case law that the states do not own the water, their con-
trol of its distribution is almost complete.43 
37. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 17 at 7. 
38. See supra text accompanying notes 16-19. 
39. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 16, at 4. 
40. Id. 
41. Id. at 123. 
42. FRANK J. TRELEASE & GEORGE A. GoULD, CASES AND MATERIALS ON WATER 
LAW 692 (4th ed. 1986) (citing Frank J. Trelease, Reclamation Water Rights, 32 
ROCKY MTN. L. REV. 464, 465 (1960). 
43. Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941 (1982). Though this case was primarily 
concerned with the restriction placed on the export of water by the state of Ne-
braska, the Court addressed the nature of the state's interest in its unappropriated 
waters. The Court explicitly rejected Nebraska's claim that the state was the own-
er of its waters. The Court analogized the state's interest in water to its interest 
in wildlife, which was expressly held to not be an ownership interest: "[t]his court 
traced the demise of the public ownership theory and defmitely recast it as 'but a 
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Any system that is going to adequately protect wetlands 
must address the problem of what is being taken out of 
wetlands, not just what is being put into them. The public 
trust doctrine can step in to fill this gap in the federal wetlands 
protection system. The public trust doctrine has not only 
evolved in such a manner that a state may use it to protect 
water resources, but it may well be applied to protect the vari-
ous values associated with wetland ecosystems. 
Ill. HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE 
PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE 
A. History of the Doctrine 
It is actually very difficult to say what the public trust 
doctrine "is." In fact, to call it a doctrine is probably not com-
pletely accurate.44 In reality it is fifty-one separate doctrines 
that vary from state to state and from the state to federal sys-
tems.45 Each version of the public trust doctrine, however, 
does require that certain public interests in state waters, or 
interests connected with those waters, be given special protec-
tion by the courts. What is protected, and to what extent it is 
protected, depends on the jurisdiction in question. 
The public trust has its roots in Roman law. As long ago 
as the Institutes of Justinian, running waters, "were res com-
munes - things common to all and property of none."46 Use of 
rivers, the sea and its shores were free for all.47 This concept 
spread among the various civil law countries, finding its way 
into the Napoleonic Code and Spanish law.48 
fiction expressive in legal shorthand of the importance to its people that a State 
have power to preserve and regulate the exploitation of an important resource.'" !d. 
at 951. 
A state manages the water within its jurisdiction, but cannot be said to own it. 
44. Laura H. Kosloff, Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi: Is the Public Trust 
Becoming Synonymous with the Public Interest?, 18 ENVTL. L. REP. 10200, 10201 
(1988). 
45. Wilkinson, supra note 23, at 425 n. 1. 
46. United State v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725, 744 (1950). 
47. "The Institutes of Justinian summarize the Roman law public trust: 'Things 
common to mankind by the law of nature, are the air, running water, the sea, and 
consequently the shores of the sea.'" McCurdy, Public Trust Protection for Wetlands, 
19 ENVTL. L., 683, 685, n.ll (1989), (quoting J. Inst. 2.1.1). 
48. Gerlach, 339 U.S. at 944-945; see also Dunning, supra note 21, at 17-6 n.10 
(1984)(quoting Las Siete Partidas 3.28.6 (Scott trans. & ed. 1932)). Spanish law 
provided, "Every man has a right to use the rivers for commerce and fisheries, to 
tie up to the banks, and to land cargo and fish on them." 
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American public trust concepts arise directly from those 
developed under the English common law which stated thatjus 
publicum was held in trust for the people by the Crown. Most 
notable among these protected interests were the coasts and 
rivers affected by the tide.49 The English public trust doctrine 
primarily prohibited the Crown from alienating such waters 
and lands. 50 
B. Development of the Public Trust in the United States 
As successors to the King of England, the original thirteen 
colonies incorporated the English common law concept of the 
public trust into American law.51 The people of each state 
were considered to hold all navigable waters and the land un-
derlying them in common.52 Navigable waters in territories of 
the United States which had not yet been granted statehood 
were held in trust by the federal govemment.53 Upon admis-
sion to the Union, title to the navigable waters within the new 
state and the land underlying them passed to the state under 
what is called the equal footing doctrine. 54 
49. See supra note 23, at 431. 
50. Dunning, supra note 22, at 17-5 note 9. 
The right to alienate public rights, E.G., of fishery, was taken from the Crown by 
Magna Charta. [Cite ommited] An illustrative case is Malcomson v. O'Day, 11 Eng. 
Rep. 1155, 1156 X H.L.C. 593 (H.L. 1862): 
!d. 
The soil of navigable tidal rivers, so far as the tide flows and reflows, is 
prima facia in the Crown, and the right of fishery therein is prima facie 
in the public. But the right to exclude the public therefrom ... existed 
in the crown, and might, lawfully, have been exercised by the Crown 
before Magna Charta. 
51. Kosloff, supra note 44, at 10201. 
52. Martin v. Waddell's Lessee, 41 U.S.(16 Pet.) 367, 412-13 (1842). 
53. Borax Consol. v. City of Los Angeles, 296 U.S. 10, 15-16 (1935). Cited by 
McCurdy, supra note 47. 
54. In Pollard's Lessee v. Hagen, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 223 (1845), the Su-
preme Court announced the equal footing doctrine, with the intention that the new 
states receive all the powers of soveriegnity enjoyed by the original states. Since 
the navigable waters and their beds were held in trust by the original states, all 
subsequent states acquired such sovereign control. This doctrine did not, however, 
grant title to the state of other federally owned lands. See also Illinois Central 
R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892). 
Some states have subsequently attempted to extend the equal footing doctrine to 
all lands owned by the federal government within the state. This view has been 
expressly rejected by the courts, that continue to limit the doctrine's application to 
navigable waters and their beds. Nevada ex rel. Nevada State Board of Agriculture 
v. United States, 512 F. Supp. 166 (D.Nev. 1981), affd, 699 F.2d 486 (9th Cir. 
1983). 
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Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois55 is the seminal 
case on the public trust doctrine and its early development in 
the United States. Illinois Central made it clear that the 
states held actual title to navigable waters, and that the sover-
eign control of those waters were limited by the parameters of 
the trust. 56 
According to the facts of Illinois Central, the Illinois legis-
lature granted a considerable amount of Chicago's waterfront 
to the Illinois Central Railroad, along with the submerged 
lands under Chicago's harbor.57 Because of the dubious cir-
cumstances under which the grant was made, the legislature 
rescinded the grant. 58 The State of Illinois sought a decree con-
firming its title to the bed of Lake Michigan. 59 
The Court accepted outright that the state of Illinois held 
title to the navigable waters and the land underlying them, 
thus giving it power, at least hypothetically, to grant away its 
interest.60 However, the Court made it clear that title was 
held in trust for the public and that the state could dispose of 
such lands only if such disposition did not conflict with the 
public interest in them.61 The Court held the legislature's 
recission of the transfer to be valid in light of the State's duties 
under the public trust doctrine. 62 
Even in light of relatively clear acceptance of the public 
trust doctrine, it is not entirely clear whether the doctrine is 
grounded in state or federal law. The public trust doctrine is 
55. 146 U.S. 387 (1892). 
56. ld. at 453. 
57. ld. at 340 n.l. 
58. ld. at 410-11. 
59. ld. at 412. 
60. The Illinois Central Court stated: 
It is settled law of this country that the ownership of and dominion and 
soveriegnity over lands covered by tide waters, within the limits of the 
several States, belong to the respective States within which they are 
found, with the consequent right to use or dispose of any portion thereof, 
when that can be done without substantial impairment of the interest of 
the public in the waters .... This doctrine has been often announced by 
this court, and is not questioned by counsel of any of the parties. 
Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 435 (1892)(citing Pollard's 
Lessee v. Hagen, 44 U.S.(3 How.) 212 (1845)). 
61. Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 453 (holding that the control of the State for 
the purpose of the trust can never be lost, except as to such parcels as are used 
in promoting the interests of the public therein, or can be disposed of without any 
substantial impairment of the public interest in the lands and water remaining). 
62. ld. at 464. 
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commonly perceived as a state law concept,63 but the early 
cases on the subject refer to it as a federal law doctrine.64 
The legal foundation of the public trust is also not particu-
larly clear. Four possible sources have been forwarded by com-
mentators:65 first, some claim the doctrine arises from federal 
common law; second, some have forwarded the theory that the 
doctrine arises from the Guarantee Clause, a view which can 
be implied from the language of Illinois Central; third, Con-
gressional preemption is seen as a likely source of the doctrine; 
and finally, and probably the most convincing alternative, some 
claim that the doctrine arises from the Commerce Clause it-
self.66 
Regardless of the doctrine's legal foundation, it is clear 
that power to administer and define the outward reach of the 
trust lies with the states, though the state's power to decrease 
the impact of the trust may be limited.67 An alternative way 
of expressing this: federal law determines the minimum reach 
of the public trust, and state law determines the outward ex-
pansion of the trust. 
What makes the public trust potentially useful in the pro-
tection of wetlands is that states have been willing to expand 
the trust beyond its original purpose of protecting public use of 
navigable waters. In fact, the trust has been expanded to pro-
tect a variety of public interests. 68 
63. McCurdy, supra note 47. 
64. Wilkinson, supra note 23, at 453. "Illinois Central, however, seems plainly 
to have been premised on federal law. The briefs relied upon both federal cases 
and authority from many different states, of which Illinois was just one." 
65. !d. at 455. 
66. !d. at 453-59. 
67. !d. at 461. According to Wilkinson: 
!d. 
There are powerful state interests - powerful enough to induce the im-
plied transfer in the first place - and strong national interests - strong 
enough to impress an implicit trust on these highly valued natural re-
sources. It does not make sense that a state could abdicate a federally 
and constitutionally imposed trust completely. 
68. See infra note 92. 
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IV. APPLICATION OF THE PuBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE TO 
WETLANDS PROTECTION 
A. Extension of the Trust 
485 
The public trust doctrine has expanded considerably over 
the years, protecting interests beyond navigability. The trust's 
scope varies greatly from state to state, protecting interests 
ranging from stream access69 to clean drinking water. 70 The 
trust's scope depends in great part on a liberal definition of 
navigability. There are at least three definitions of navigabili-
ty,71 each serving a different purpose: navigability for deter-
mining federal jurisdiction,72 navigability under the equal foot-
ing doctrine,73 and navigability under a prong of the public 
trust doctrine known as the public use doctrine. 74 
1. Expanding the Definition of Navigability. 
The definition of navigability for the purposes of general 
federal jurisdiction was expanded from the ebb and flow defi-
nition of English Common Law to a navigability in fact test.75 
This test was in turn expanded to include waters that could be 
69. Montana Coalition for Stream Access, Inc. v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163 (Mont. 
1984). 
70. Mayor of the City of Clifton v. Passaic Valley Water Comm'n., 539 A.2d 
760, 765 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987). 
71. Kosloff, supra note 44, at 10205. It should be noted that the jurisdiction of 
section 404 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act is dependent on a different, 
very liberal, definition of navigability. 
72. 33 u.s.c. § 403 (1989). 
73. Pollard's Lessee v. Hagen, 44 U.S.(3 How.) 212, 223 (1845). 
74. See Ralph W. Johnson, Public Trust Protection for Stream Flows and Lake 
Levels, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 233, 248-49 (1980). The terminology "public use doc-
trine" may be loosely associated with jus publicum. However, the courts have been 
very loose in the use of this language, making it hard to tell when they are talk-
ing about the public trust or public use, or if they perceive the doctrines as being 
different at all. See id. at 248-49 n.63. 
ld. 
The public use doctrine is so closely allied and so parallel to the public 
trust doctrine in its protection of in-place water uses that it can justifi-
ably be claimed as a part, or a different form of expression, of the public 
trust doctrine. Courts have used the public use doctrine, developed largely 
since the Second World War, to protect the public right of navigation on 
waters that are recreationally but not commercially navigable, where the 
beds are generally privately owned. 
75. Dunning, supra note 22, at 17-18. 
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made navigable with reasonable improvements. 76 
Navigability under the equal footing doctrine is more nar-
rowly defined than it is for federal jurisdiction. Here the defi-
nition is also navigability in fact, but it is limited to the ordi-
nary condition of the water before improvement.77 
The definition of navigability under the public use doctrine 
is the most expansive of these definitions. In fact, some have 
questioned whether any kind of navigability is a prerequisite to 
the application of this doctrine at all. 78 In reality, the defini-
tion varies from state to state, but most often it is based on 
some historical use of the water for recreational or general 
public use. 79 
Some have forwarded the view that the public trust doc-
trine and the public use doctrine are in fact two different legal 
concepts. However, the public use and the public trust arise 
from the identical concept of state ownership of navigable wa-
ters, and it is perhaps most logical to view the public use doc-
trine as being a subset of the public trust. 80 
2. What the Public Trust Protects. 
Of the three definitions of navigability, only the one appli-
cable to the concept of public use is broad enough to protect 
wetlands to any extent.81 Expressing any specific rules on 
what the public use doctrine protects is as difficult as making 
general statements about the public trust, because it is in fact 
76. United States v. Appalachian Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 408 (1940). 
77. Illinois Central R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892). 
78. Kosloff, supra note 44, at 10208. 
79. Lamprey v. Metcalf, 53 N.W. 1139 (Minn. 1893) (The public trust protects 
sailing, rowing, fowling, bathing, skating and domestic, agricultural and city water 
needs.). 
80. Johnson, supra note 74, at 252. As is the case with the public trust gen-
erally, the source of the state's power under the public use doctrine is not at all 
clear. Courts have articulated three broad justifications for their exercise of the 
trust power over the waters of the state. First, some have held a public use of 
waters for recreational boating, fishing etc, to be a public riparian right. Second, 
some courts have based the doctrine on the Northwest Ordinance and to state 
constitutions which guarantee navigation of the Missouri and Mississippi rivers, 
including their tributaries. Third, some courts have based the doctrine on state 
constitutional language which declares waters of the state as being the domain of 
the citizens of the state. ld. at 250-51. 
81. Because most wetlands involve amounts of water insufficient to make them 
"navigable in fact," common law definitions are unable to protect them. Section 404 
operates under a much broader definition of navigability which gives it jurisdiction 
over wetlands regardless of "navigability in fact." 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (1989). 
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fifty different doctrines.82 Most states, however, use the pub-
lic use doctrine to protect some sort of activity or use of public 
waters.83 
Some commentators have argued that navigability for the 
purposes of the public trust is no longer a concern.84 In fact, 
several courts have protected certain interests regardless of 
whether definitions of navigability were met.85 That the defi-
nition of navigability is no longer relevant at all is probably an 
overstatement. The definition of navigability may or may not 
be a factor depending on the jurisdiction and the interests 
being addressed. 86 
B. How the Public Trust Can Protect Wetlands 
The public trust doctrine applies wetlands protection in 
two ways: protection of the wetland's water interests, and pro-
tection of wetlands for their uses. 
82. Kosloff, supra note 44, at 10206. 
83. National Audubon Society v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983), cert. 
denied, 464 U.S. 777 (1983) (appropriative water rights are subject to the public 
trust); Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374 (Cal. 1971) (public trust doctrine protects 
food and habitat for fish and wildlife); Gould v. Greylock Reservation Comm'n, 215 
N.E.2d 114 (Mass. 1966) (trust requires strict judicial review when state parklands 
are leased for private use); Lamprey v. Metcalf, 53 N.W. 1139 (Minn. 1893) (public 
trust protects sailing, rowing, fowling, bathing, skating and domestic, agricultural 
and city water needs); Jerke v. State Dep't of Lands, 597 P.2d 49 (Mont. 1979) 
(public trust demands that full market value be paid when public lands are 
leased); Mayor of Clifton v. Passaic Valley Water Comm'n, 539 A.2d 760 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987) (drinking water is protected by the public trust); 
Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass'n, 471 A.2d 355 (N.J. 1984), cert. denied, 
469 U.S. 821 (1984) (public access to dry sand beaches protected by public trust); 
United Plainsmen Ass'n v. North Dakota State Water Conservation Comm'n, 247 
N.W.2d 457 (N.D. 1976) (broad duty to protect the people's water interests in con-
sidering large scale water allocations). 
84. Johnson, supra note 73 at 250, n.66: "Professor Corker argued persuasively 
as long ago as 1970 that the whole concept of navigability for determining any-
thing other than the floating of a supreme court opinion should be abandoned. The 
concept is confusing, slippery, unpredictable, antique and irrelevant to today's prob-
lems." See also Kosloff, supra note 44, at 10206. 
85. People v. Truckee Lumber Co., 48 P. 374 (Cal. 1897) (enjoined a mill from 
polluting the Truckee river because it was killing the fish, even though the river 
passed through private land); Montana Coalition for Stream Access, Inc. v. Curran, 
682 P.2d 163 (Mont. 1984) (recreational use of river for fishing in itself made 
stream navigable); Just v. Marinette County, 201 N.W.2d 761 (Wis. 1972) (swamps 
and wetlands necessary part of the ecology and were connected with navigable 
waterways). 
86. Mark v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374 (Cal. 1971) (action to quiet title in tide-
lands). 
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1. Protection of Wetland Water Interests. 
As was discussed earlier, the loss of wetlands through 
appropriation and diversion of water resources is significant.87 
It is possible that a state might assert the public trust doctrine 
to halt allocation of water to protect wetlands within the state. 
The state has a strong proprietary interest in the alloca-
tion of the water resources within its borders.88 On several 
occasions, this interest has been deemed significant enough to 
justify application of the trust to water allocations. 
In United Plainsmen Ass'n v. North Dakota State Water 
Conservation Commission,89 the North Dakota Supreme Court 
stated that the public trust doctrine requires that the state 
consider both short and long term impacts on trust interests 
before large appropriations of water can be made.90 "Confined 
to traditional concepts, the Doctrine confirms the State's role as 
trustee of the public waters. It permits alienation and alloca-
tion of such precious state resources only after an analysis of 
the present supply and future need."91 
United Plainsmen is noteworthy. Although the North Da-
kota Supreme Court did not directly address the issue of navi-
gability, it implied that the state's duty under the trust extend-
ed beyond navigability to the resource itself. 92 This rule 
would potentially extend the trust to allocations of ground 
water as well as to surface waters. A broad reading of the 
case, and similar holdings by other courts, would also extend 
the trust to other natural resources within the state over which 
the state holds a proprietary interest, such as minerals, wildlife 
and timber.93 
United Plainsmen can possibly be applied to protect 
wetlands in two ways. First, it could require protection of 
87. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 17, at 7. 
88. See, e.g., Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941 (1982). 
89. 247 N.W.2d 457 (N.D. 1976). 
90. ld. at 464. 
91. ld. 
92. The court in this case also relied upon statutory and constitutional lan-
guage to find authority for the trust. !d. at 461. 
93. People v. Truckee Lumber Co., 48 P. 374 (Cal. 1897), is another example of 
the extension of the trust to other natural resource interests, in this case, the 
protection of fish. Because the fish fell under the protection of the trust, the wa-
ters upon which they were dependent were also subject to the protection of the 
trust. 
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wetlands under the auspices of the trust duty over state wa-
ters. Because wetlands rejuvenate aquifers, control runoff and 
purify water, the quality and quantity of both ground and sur-
face water directly depends in many situations on the well 
being of wetlands.94 From this connection with a protected 
state water source, an affirmative duty may be implied under 
the trust to consider the short and long term impact on 
wetlands before any destructive activity is undertaken. Such 
an approach is particularly appealing because of its indepen-
dence from any finding of navigability, thus protecting 
wetlands that cannot qualify as navigable. 95 
Second, many other important state natural resources 
protected by the public trust, particularly wildlife, may be de-
pendent on wetlands for their continuing vitality. Because of 
this, the wetlands may also qualify for protection under the 
trust if such a vital connection exists.96 
Trust protection based on a connection with some other 
protected state resource does have weaknesses. Foremost 
among these are: 1) it depends on state interpretation of the 
trust, which may be limited depending on the jurisdiction, 2) it 
only imputes a duty to consider trust concerns - limited 
wetland impacts might not justify intervention by the courts if 
the legislature has already considered such impact, and 3) it 
requires the court to base protection on some connection to a 
protected waterway, which may or may not be sufficiently veri-
fiable. 
Wetlands that can qualify as navigable under the applica-
ble state definition may be directly protected from deprivation 
of their water resources. National Audubon Society v. Superior 
Court of Alpine County,97 is perhaps the best example of the 
judicial restriction of water allocations to protect trust interests 
in a navigable body of water. In that case, the California Su-
preme Court ordered reconsideration of the allocation of two 
streams used by the City of Los Angeles since 1970.98 As a 
result of these allocations, the level of Mono Lake, a saline 
body of water near the Sierra Nevada Mountains, dropped to 
94. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 17, at 47-51. 
95. United Plainsmen Ass'n v. North Dakota State Water Conservation Comm'n., 
247 N.W.2d 457, 463 (N.D. 1976) 
96. People v, Truckee Lumber Co., 48 P. 374 (Cal. 1897). 
97. 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983). 
98. ld. at 732-33. 
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levels that endangered the "scenic beauty and ecological val-
ues" of the lake. 99 
Mter first determining Mono Lake to be a navigable body 
of water/00 the court announced, "that the public trust doc-
trine . . . protects navigable waters from harm caused by di-
version of nonnavigable tributaries."101 
Along with extending the trust beyond the shores of the 
navigable body to limit appropriations from tributary waters, 
the court held that water rights appropriated prior to any nega-
tive impact on the protected water body were not absolute, but 
were subject to, "a duty of continuing supervision over the 
taking and use of the appropriated water."102 The court also 
said, "The state accordingly has the power to reconsider allo-
cation decisions even though those decisions were made after 
due consideration of their effect on the public trust."103 In 
light of the fact that the appropriations in this case were grant-
ed in 1940,104 and the case finally decided in 1983, the reach 
of the public trust in California is long indeed. 
What impact could this ruling have on the protection of 
wetlands? First, it could bar water allocations that could dam-
age navigable wetlands, be they surface or groundwater alloca-
tions. Second, taken to its logical extreme, this expression of 
the public trust doctrine could allow the state to reconsider and 
revoke water rights to allow for the reclamation of once naviga-
ble wetlands. This could be an incredibly potent weapon, 
though dangerous to use in light of the policy and political 
ramifications involved in revoking long relied upon water 
rights. 
The use of the public trust doctrine to protect wetland 
water interests does have inherent limitations. First, because 
99. !d. at 711. 
100. ld. at 719. California operates the trust under a liberal definition of navi-
gability. "A waterway usable only for pleasure boating is nevertheless a navigable 
waterway and protected by the public trust." !d. at 720, n.l7. 
Such a definition could well apply to relatively shallow wetlands, where flat boats 
have been used in waterfowl hunting or fishing etc., potentially impacting a broad 
number of wetlands. Board of Univ. School Lands v. Andrus, 671 F.2d 271 (8th 
Cir. 1982), is another example of such a liberal definition of navigability which 
could potentially reach wetlands (use of small recreational boats and floating logs). 
See also Montana Coalition for Stream Access, Inc. v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163 (Mont. 
1984), extends the trust to all waters usable for recreational purposes. 
101. Audubon, 658 P.2d at 721 (citations ommited). 
102. !d. at 728. 
103. ld. 
104. ld. at 711. 
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the parameters of the trust are defined by state law, 105 not 
all jurisdictions will allow it to reach so far as to revoke exist-
ing water rights or impact allocations from tributary streams 
flowing into the navigable body.106 No general rule can be 
stated, and the reach of the rule will depend on the jurisdic-
tion. 
Second, the application of the public trust in this form still 
depends on a definition of navigability, liberal though it may 
be. Under the current definition of wetlands/07 a large num-
ber of wetlands areas would not be protected from water allo-
cation for want of navigability or connection to a protected body 
of water. 108 
2. Protection of Wetlands for Public Uses. 
Certain states have been willing to extend the public trust 
beyond the protection of water and resources to protect uses 
traditionally carried out on the public trust waters. These 
courts have not restricted themselves to definitions of naviga-
bility in many instances, and in some cases have held that the 
trust protects those activities even when the land underlying 
the waterways is owned by a private party.109 
Uses receiving protection under the public trust doctrine 
fall primarily under two categories: recreational and wildlife 
habitat. 
Recreational uses protected by the trust have included 
boating, swimming, bathing, hunting and skating. 110 Mon-
tana Coalition for Stream Access v. Curran 111 is an example 
of how the public trust may be applied to create a recreational 
trust. This case concerned the right of the public to access the 
Dearborn River as it passed through the property of the defen-
105. Wilkinson, supra note 23, at 464 n.164. 
106. Dunning, supra note 22, at 17-45. "The future in Western states other than 
California is much less clear. United Plamsmen from North Dakota and Kootenai 
Environmental Alliance from Idaho may be read as effectively being as broad as 
Audubon, or they may be narrowly confined." ld. 
107. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, supra note 3. 
108. United Plainsmen Ass'n v. North Dakota State Water Conservation Comm'n, 
247 N.W.2d 457 (N.D. 1976). 
109. Montana Coalition for Stream Access v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163 (Mont. 1984). 
110. Lamprey v. Metcalf, 53 N.W. 1139 (Minn. 1893) (public trust protects 
sailing, rowing, fowling, bathing, & skating). But see Idaho Forest Indus. v. Hayden 
Lake Watershed Improvement district, 733 P.2d 733 (Idaho 1987), McCurdy, Public 
Trust Protection for Wetlands, 19 ENVTL. L. 682 (1989). 
111. 682 P.2d 163 (Mont. 1984). 
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dant, who also claimed title to the banks and the bed of the 
river where it passed through his property. The court held 
that the river in question, though not navigable in fact, was 
navigable under the more liberal state definition of navigabili-
ty112 and, thus, protected by the public trust. 
The court considered more than navigability while consid-
ering the protection of recreational interests. The court held 
that past recreational use of a stream made it navigable m 
fact. The court stated: 
The capability of use of the waters for recreational purposes 
determines their availability for recreational use by the pub-
lic. Streambed ownership by a private party is irrelevant. If 
the waters are owned by the State, and held in trust for the 
people of the State, no private party may bar the use of those 
waters by the people. The Constitution and the public trust 
doctrine do not permit a private party to interfere with the 
public's right to recreational use of the surface of the State's 
waters. 113 
This embodiment of the public trust could be applied to the 
protection of wetlands. If it could be shown that such wetlands 
are or have been used for recreational purposes, then public 
use of those waters could not be denied on the basis of private 
ownership. 
The extent of this interpretation of the public trust is not 
at all clear. Its application to wetlands protection would be 
dependent on interpretations of at least two key terms. First, 
what is meant in "interfering with use"114 of state owned wa-
112. The state of Montana applies the federal "log floating test." This test de-
clares a body of water navigable if logs have been floated on it sometime, even 
before statehood, that body of water was navigable in fact. The body of water 
would be considered navigable even if the logs could only be floated on the river 
during part of the year. ld. at 166. 
113. Montana Coalition for Stream Access v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163, 170 (Mont. 
1984). Wyoming has a similar public trust protection for recreational uses of water: 
Irrespective of the ownership of the bed or channel of waters, and irre-
spective of their navigability, the public has the right to use public wa-
ters of this State for floating usable craft and that use may not be inter-
fered with or curtailed by any landowner. Is also the right of the public 
while so lawfully floating the state's waters to lawfully hunt or fish or do 
any and all other things which are not otherwise made unlawful. 
Day v. Armstrong, 362 P.2d 137, 147 (Wyo, 1961). 
114. Montana Coalition, 682 P.2d at 170. It is clear that the court has limited 
its holding to interference with the use of waters protected by the trust, and not 
with access to them. "We grant a cautionary note that nothing in this opinion 
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ters? Broadly defined, it could be interpreted to include drain-
ing or denying water to a wetland area making it unusable for 
recreational purposes. Under such a definition a vast amount 
of wetlands could be protected without the necessity of finding 
navigability. Narrowly interpreted, interference could be held 
to extend no further than restricting physical presence on the 
wetland. Under this definition, wetlands would be afforded 
very little or no protection of their water resources. 
Second, the application of this recreational trust depends 
on the court's definition of recreation. It clearly applies to 
hunting, fishing, boating and other traditional outdoor activi-
ties.115 The language of the opinion appears broad enough to 
include birdwatching, hiking, plant collecting, photography and 
other less traditional recreational activities. 116 It is possible 
that wetlands involving too little water to allow for recreational 
boating might not be protected by a recreational trust. 117 De-
pending on the definitions given to key terms by a state court, 
the recreational trust that exists in some jurisdictions could 
afford tremendous protection to wetlands. 
There is another potential limit to this doctrine other than 
the meaning of these key terms. The Supreme Court of Mon-
tana made it clear that the recreational trust extended only to 
the waters "owned" by the state, and not to privately owned 
waters. 118 Thus a wetland that might otherwise be protected 
under the recreational trust would receive no protection at all 
because it was a part of a private party's vested water rights. 
Other courts have implied that the public trust might also 
be extended to protect the wildlife dependent upon state wa-
ters.119 This application of the trust differs from the recre-
ational trust in that the animals are the users as well as the 
protected interest. 
shall be construed as granting the public the right to enter upon or cross over 
private property to reach the State owned waters .... " !d. at 172. See also supra 
note 112. 
115. !d. at 170. 
116. !d. 
117. "The Consitution and the public trust doctrine do not permit a private 
party to interfere with the public's right to recreational use of the surface of the 
State's waters." !d. 
The court's emphasis on the use of the surface of the water seems to imply a body 
of water at least large enough for small craft use. 
118. !d. 
119. People v. Truckee Lumber Co., 48 P. 374 (Cal. 1897). 
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In People v. Truckee Lumber Co., 120 the question was 
raised whether the state had a cause of action against a lumber 
mill that was polluting the Truckee river and killing off the 
fish population. The California Supreme Court held that even 
though the Truckee river was not navigable, and thus not sub-
ject to the public trust itself, the fish living in the river were 
subject to the public trust as commonly owned property of the 
citizens of the state. 121 
The protection of the public trust over the fish extended 
beyond their habitat in public waters. "To the extent that wa-
ters are the common passageway for fish, although flowing over 
lands entirely subject to private ownership, they are deemed 
for such purposes public waters, and subject to all laws of the 
state regulating the right of fishery."122 The court held that 
the state did indeed have the power to enjoin the pollution of 
the river. 
The literal reading of this ruling would extend the protec-
tion of the public trust to wetlands serving as habitat for ani-
mals and wildlife. This would at least restrict actual physical 
damage to the wetland in question and could also be extended 
to restrict water allocations that harm wetlands. 
The Wisconsin Supreme Court in Just v. Marinette Coun-
ty, 123 extended the trust to actually protect shoreline 
wetlands regardless of their ownership. They made no specific 
mention of navigability as a requirement and seemed to imply 
that the wetlands deserved public trust protection for their own 
sake. 124 
Both of these decisions appear to apply to the protection of 
wetlands. The greatest possible limits on their application are 
the willingness of the state courts to extend the trust to pro-
tection of wildlife regardless of navigability. 
In Marks v. Whitney/25 the California Supreme Court al-
luded to a potentially broad application of the public trust doc-
trine to wildlife and ecological interests. Though dealing with 
tidelands that they had previously found to fall under the defi-
120. ld. 
121. ld. at 374. 
122. ld. at 375. 
123. 201 N.W.2d 761 (Wis. 1972). 
124. ld. at 766. The Court made no specific mention of navigability, but the 
decision could be at least partially explained on the connection of the wetlands to 
a large navigable lake. See McCurdy, supra note 47. 
125. 491 P.2d 374 (Cal. 1971). 
475] WETLANDS 495 
nition of navigability, they stated: 
There is a growing public recognition that one of the most 
important public uses of the tidelands - a use encompassed 
within the tidelands trust - is the preservation of those 
lands in their natural state, so that they may serve as eco-
logical units for scientific study, as open space, and environ-
ments which provide food and habitat for birds and marine 
life, and which favorably affect the scenery and climate of the 
area. 126 
This case is clearly limited in its application - tidelands 
themselves are a protected use of the public trust when navi-
gable - but it does express a growing concern with previously 
ignored elements of our environment. 
Judges hold a variety of tools under the public trust, and it 
is foreseeable that they could extend the public trust protection 
to wetlands. 
V. SUMMARY 
The public trust doctrine has expanded considerably from 
its initial interpretation of protecting the navigability of public 
water ways. This expansion of the trust may well have taken 
in the protection of wetlands. 
The application of the public trust to the protection of 
wetlands is subject to the definition and reach that individual 
states have given to the doctrine. Depending on the jurisdic-
tion in question, the trust might be invoked to protect the wa-
ter resources upon which the wetlands are dependent, to pro-
tect the wildlife which are dependent on the wetlands for their 
continued vitality, or in some circumstances, to protect the 
wetlands for their own sake. 
The possible application of the trust to wetlands has in-
herent weaknesses. It is in no way a panacea for the ills of our 
Nation's wetlands. It may, however, in some situations, be 
invoked to protect a given wetland area, an area that might 
otherwise be endangered under the current statutory 
protections. 
Michael L. Wolz 
126. Id. at 380. 
